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ENFORCING THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT:
THE ORIGINAL
UNDERSTANDING
BRADFORD WILSON*
INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution has un-
questionably been one of the most litigated provisions of the Bill of
Rights.' Its burgeoning case law in the 20th century has centered on the
exclusionary rule, the function of which is to provide a legal formula for
determining the circumstances under which a violation of the search and
seizure requirements of the fourth amendment renders evidence inadmis-
sible in a criminal proceeding.' Under current doctrine all evidence ob-
tained in such a manner is prohibited from a criminal trial in which the
victim of the unconstitutional seizure is a defendant.'
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, California State College, San Bernardino; B.A.,
North Carolina State University, 1973; M.A., Northern Illinois University, 1977; Ph.D., The
Catholic University of America, 1981. The author gratefully acknowledges the Reason Foun-
dation for their support through a 1982 Summer Research Fellowship.
See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-85 (1980); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753, 757 (1979); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978); United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1977). The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
I See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980); United
States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 280 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492-94, reh'g
denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1948). See
generally Teague, Applications of the Exclusionary Rule, 23 S. Tx. L.J. 633, 635-37
(1982); Note, Confusion Regarding Exclusion: The Evolution of the Fourth Amendment, 23
Aiuz. L. Rav. 801, 806-10 (1981); Comment, The Exclusionary Rule Revisited: Good Faith
in Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure, 70 Ky. L.J. 879, 879-88 (1981-1982).
3 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-83, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976). The exclu-
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Since the inception of the exclusionary rule, nearly every search and
seizure case that has reached the Supreme Court has addressed one cru-
cial question: Was the evidence that was introduced at trial obtained in
violation of the requirements of the fourth amendment, thereby render-
ing it inadmissible in the court proceeding? In order to answer this ques-
tion, the Court must dutifully examine the fourth amendment in search
of the constitutional standard governing the circumstances in the instant
case. Thus, the invocation of the exclusionary rule results in an additional
construction of the fourth amendment. As Jacob Landynski has noted,
"[w]ithout the exclusionary rule, the illegality of the search would be im-
material to the admission of the evidence, and the judicial development
of the Fourth Amendment as we know it would have proved impossible."
4
This special dependence of the modern history of the construction of
fourth amendment rights on the rule of exclusion has encouraged many
friends of fourth amendment liberties to favor the exclusionary rule as
the method of enforcement most in harmony with the ends served by the
amendment.8 Yet the Constitution had been in effect for nearly a century
before the Supreme Court found in it any support for the exclusion of
evidence procured in violation of the fourth amendment. This fact is sig-
nificant for understanding the revolution in constitutional interpretation
achieved by the Court's adoption of the exclusionary rule. It implies that,
prior to 1886, before the fourth amendment was first invoked to exclude
evidence from a trial proceeding, another view of the consequences of an
unreasonable search and seizure predominated in American legal
thought.e This Article attempts to illustrate the preexclusionary under-
sionary rule is enforced, in both state and federal courts, in connection with four categories
of constitutional violations: illegal searches and seizures, confessions and identifications ob-
tained in violation of the defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights, and police conduct
violative of due process. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 665, 665 (1970).
The Supreme Court first excluded evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure in
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886). It was not until 1914, however, that the
Supreme Court required application of the exclusionary rule in federal courts purely on the
basis of the fourth amendment. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). Although
the Court initially refused to impose the rule on state courts, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 33 (1949), it did so extend the rule in the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961). See generally Oaks, supra, at 667-72.
4 J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 86 (1966); see 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT 3 (1978) ("It is primarily because of the exclusionary rule that courts
are called upon to meet the seemingly increasing challenge of marking the dimensions of the
protections flowing from the Fourth Amendment").
I See Rader, Legislating a Remedy for the Fourth Amendment, 23 S. TEx. L.J. 585, 586-87
(1982).
6 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1886). For a comprehensive account of
the judicial creation and evolution of the exclusionary rule, see Wilson, The Origin and
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standing of the legal consequences following upon a violation of the
fourth amendment, by outlining the positions taken by the Framers and
the early judiciary and by reconstructing the political and jurisprudential
context in which those positions were forged.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT As LAW
In Marbury v. Madison,7 Chief Justice Marshall described one of the
primary reasons why individuals live together in civil society. "The very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of
the first duties of government is to afford that protection."'6 The Chief
Justice set up his "first duty" as a standard by which to judge the still
fledgling National Government. "The government of the United States
has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It
will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no
remedy for the violation of a vested legal right."' As Marshall readily ac-
knowledged, his understanding of the necessary relation between the se-
curity of rights and the effective operation of laws was derived from Wil-
liam Blackstone, the great English jurist.'0 In Blackstone's Commentaries
on the Laws of England," one finds an analysis of law that lies at the
heart of the American legal order. Blackstone asserted that "it is a gen-
eral and indisputable rule that where there is a legal right, there is also a
legal remedy . ..whenever the right is invaded.""" According to Black-
stone, every law consists of four parts; the declaratory, the directory, the
remedial, and the vindicatory.13 The declaratory branch of the law postu-
lates and defines the rights to be observed and the wrongs to be
avoided;"' the directory branch enjoins those subject to the law to observe
the rights and to avoid committing the wrongs; 5 the remedial branch
points out a method to recover private rights when they are wrongfully
taken away, or to redress private wrongs; and the vindicatory branch
Development of the Federal Rule of Exclusion, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1073 (1982).
7 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
* Id. at 163.
9Id.
11 In Marbury, Marshall extensively quoted from Blackstone regarding remedies afforded
by operation of law. Id. at 163-65.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1765).
II 3 id. at *23.
I ld. at *54-57.
See id. at *54-55.
, See id. at *55-56.
o See id. at *56. Blackstone establishes the connection between remedies and the rule of
law as follows:
The remedial part of a law is so necessary a consequence of the [declaratory and
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designates the punishment to be inflicted on those who commit public
wrongs, and fail in their duty.17
directory branches] that laws must be very vague and imperfect without it. For in
vain would rights be declared, in vain directed to be observed, if there were no
method of recovering and asserting those rights, when wrongfully withheld or in-
vaded. This is what we mean properly, when we speak of the protection of the law.
Id. at *55-56 (emphasis in original). A certain confusion may arise regarding Blackstone's
definition of the remedial aspect of a law as a method of asserting or recovering rights, as
well as the protection afforded by the law, which presumably is the object of the method.
One commentator has stated that:
[I]t is because rights exist and because they are sometimes violated that remedies are
necessary. The object of all remedies is the protection of rights. Rights are protected
by means of actions or suits. The term "remedy" is applied either to the action or
suit by means of which a right is protected, or to the protection which the action or
suit affords.
Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 HARv. L. REv. 111, 111 (1887). Black-
stone, however, apparently regarded the method-object distinction in this context as one
without a substantive difference. "Method" as it is used here conveys the idea of the protec-
tion of a right or the redress of a wrong. Langdell himself, after making the above distinc-
tion, seems to slip into a Blackstonian viewpoint as he states that "[ain action may protect a
right in three ways ...." See id.
,7 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *56-57. With regard to the sanction of laws which
establish public duties, Blackstone writes:
Of all the parts of a law the most effectual is the vindicatory. For it is but lost
labor to say, "do this, or avoid that" unless we also declare, "this shall be the conse-
quence of your noncompliance." We must therefore observe, that the main strength
and force of a law consists in the penalty annexed to it. Herein is to be found the
principal obligation of human laws.
Id. at *57 (emphasis in original). It is submitted that Blackstone clearly agrees with the
Hobbesian position that laws derive their obligatory character, not from their content, but
from the effectiveness of the threat that lies behind them. Hobbes' view of human nature is
the basis for Blackstone's agreement. This can be seen in the latter's statement that "[tihe
dread of evil is a much more forcible principle of human actions than the prospect of good."
Id. at *56.
Because the law recognizes both private and public wrongs, there is a dual aim:
To redress the party injured, by either restoring to him his right, if possible, or by
giving him an equivalent... [and] also to secure to the public the benefit of society,
by preventing or punishing every breach and violation of those laws which the sover-
eign power has thought proper to establish, for the government and tranquility of the
whole.
4 id. at *7. Although the distinction between private and public wrongs is not always easy to
establish, see 1 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 33, at 17 (7th ed. 1882),
this distinction provides the basis for the division of Anglo-American law into its civil and
criminal components, see id. § 955, at 522. Blackstone states that "private wrongs, or civil
injuries, are an infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong to individuals,
considered merely as individuals; public wrongs, or crimes ... are a breach and violation of
the public rights and duties, due to the whole community ...." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 11, at *5; see 3 id. at *2. Public offenses, in most instances, also affect individuals. For
example, murder is an injury of the most grievous sort to the individual. It is also a crime
against society, however, because of the deprivation it causes and the moral example it sets
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Blackstone's articulation of the rule of law informed the legal
thought of the Founding Fathers. 8 His work was viewed as "a manual of
the received English law," and the basis for legislative and judicial devel-
opment in the circumstances of the new world.' " Blackstone's Commenta-
ries were published originally in 1765 and had appeared in ten editions by
1787. A cursory examination of early state and federal court decisions
reveals the great authority commanded by Blackstone's thought among
American jurists."'
In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall quoted the following statement
from Blackstone: "For it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws
of England, that every right, when withheld must have a remedy, and
every injury its proper redress."2 The question of how the Framers of the
Constitution expected constitutional rights to be enforced cannot prop-
erly be discussed except in light of this position maintained by both
Blackstone and Marshall. As Justice Harlan later observed, the founding
generation, following Blackstone's theory, "link[ed] 'rights' and 'remedies'
in a 1:1 correlation."22 It is unclear, however, what light this sheds on the
original understanding of the fourth amendment.
The fourth amendment consists of two clauses: the first prohibits the
violation of the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, homes,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures; 2 23 the
second establishes certain necessary conditions for the lawful issuance of
a warrant."' Although it is not obvious from the language alone, the ante-
cedent history of the amendment makes it clear that the second clause
was intended by the Framers to provide a standard, though not necessa-
rily the only standard, of what constitutes a reasonable or an unreasona-
ble search or seizure."' Thus, the language of the fourth amendment isboth declaratory and directory: it declares rights and wrongs and directs
for the rest of the community. Therefore, in some instances of wrongful conduct, both pri-
vate action and public prosecution may be entirely appropriate modes of enforcing the laws.
"8 See R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 82 (1930).
"9 Id. at 107.
,0 Blackstone's Commentaries were not only an important influence on the Framers of the
Constitution, but they continue to be a force in modern legal thought. Stone, We Inherit an
Old Gothic Castle, 8 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 923, 923-27, 945 (1981).
21 5 U.S. at 163 (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *109).
2' Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 401 n.3
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
23 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24 Id.
,6 See 1 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 610-36 (W. Carrington
ed. 1927); 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1895, at
748-50 (1833). Story states that the fourth amendment "seems indispensable to the full en-
joyment of the rights of personal security, personal liberty, and private property." 3 J.
STORY, supra, § 1895, at 748.
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their observance. A problem arises, however, when one inquires into the
remedial and vindicatory branches of the law.
No express provision for the enforcement of the fourth amendment
can be found, either in the words of the amendment itself or in any other
clause of the Constitution. On its face, there is thus an affirmation of a
right without a provision for a corresponding remedy. In addition, if a
violation of the right intended to be secured by the amendment is to be
considered as a public wrong, no punitive sanction appears to be pro-
vided. It would therefore seem that the fourth amendment, by its terms,
is an incomplete law. Given the common understanding of the nature of
law at the time of the ratification of the fourth amendment, it is incon-
ceivable that the Framers intended to recognize a right without simulta-
neously requiring that a method, either remedial or punitive, exist for its
enforcement. Yet, with regard to such a method, the fourth amendment is
silent.
How serious a problem does this present? We have ruled out the pos-
sibility that the Founding Fathers merely meant to recognize the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures without intending for the
amendment to address, or to contemplate, a meansjfor its enforcement."
One possible solution is to derive from the amendment an obligation on
the part of the National legislature, and perhaps on the part of the state
legislatures, to provide remedies and sanctions for its violation. What
Justice Story had to say with respect to the Fugitive Slave Clause is rele-
vant here:
If ... the Constitution guarantees the right, . the natural inference cer-
tainly is, that the national government is clothed with the appropriate au-
thority and functions to enforce it. The fundamental principle applicable to
all cases of this sort, would seem to be, that where the end is required, the
means are given; .... The clause is found in the national Constitution
.... It does not point out any state functionaries, or any state action to
carry its provisions into effect. The states cannot, therefore, be compelled to
enforce them; and it might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of
the power of interpretation, to insist that the states are bound to provide
means to carry into effect the duties of the national government, nowhere
delegated or intrusted to them by the Constitution. On the contrary, the
natural, if not the necessary conclusion is, that the national government, in
the absence of all.positive provisions to the contrary, is bound, through its
own proper departments, legislative, judicial, or executive, as the case may
require, to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon it by the
Constitution. The remark of Mr. Madison, in the Federalist, No. 43, would
seem in such cases to apply with peculiar force. "A right (says he) implies a
remedy; and where else would the remedy be deposited, than where it is
See supra text accompanying notes 8-22.
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deposited by the Constitution?" meaning, as the context shows, in the gov-
ernment of the United States.
7
According to Justice Story, then, the Constitution, being national in char-
acter, obligates the federal government to provide, presumably through
legislation, remedies for the violation of constitutionally guaranteed
rights; the Constitution does not, however, compel a like obligation on the
part of the states, unless it explicitly provides for such."s
The Constitution is properly called national, however, not in the
sense that it is the fundamental law of the nation as distinct from the
states, but rather in the sense that it is the fundamental law for every
part of the Union, including the states. Every one of its provisions is a
part-the paramount part-of the laws of every state in the Union.
Therefore, it does not appear to be contrary to the plan of the Constitu-
tion to suggest that an authority devolves upon the people of the United
States to use their state legislatures, as well as their national legislature,
to pass laws aiding in the execution of the fundamental compact binding
them one to another.29 The Supremacy Clause protects against any at-
27 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615-16 (1842).
U Justice Story found support for his theory in a statement by James Madison in The Fed-
eralist No. 43: "A right implies a remedy; and where else would the remedy be deposited,
than where it is deposited by the Constitution?" 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 616 (1842) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 274-75 (J. Madison) (W. Kendall & G. Carey ed. 1966)). Justice
Story's attempt to enlist the authority of Madison to support his position is seriously defec-
tive. A glance at the context of Madison's remark, quoted by Story, reveals that Madison
was discussing article IV, section 4, of the Constitution, which provides that:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of
the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic Violence.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The right protected here is that of each state to a republican form
of government and to security from invasion. See id. It obviously was given constitutional
status because of the unreliability or the inadequacy of self-protection by the states; thus,
the United States is expressly obligated to provide such protection. Therefore, the only con-
tribution offered by The Federalist No. 43 to our understanding of the issue of constitu-
tional enforcement is that the Federal Government has an obligation to enforce a constitu-
tional guarantee when such a duty is given it in express terms by the Constitution. This
undebatable proposition provides no support for Justice Story's claim that the Constitution
depends solely on the Federal Government for enforcement of its provisions, except where
the constitutional language relies explicitly on the states.
" This was the position taken by Chief Justice Taney in response to Justice Story in Prigg.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 633 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). In addition, this position is supported by
Alexander Hamilton's statement in The Federalist No. 32, where it is argued that with
regard to certain matters of national concern, the federal and state legislatures have concur-
rent power. See THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 198 (A. Hamilton) (W. Kendall & G. Carey ed.
1966). He states:
[A]s the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the
State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before
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tempt by the states to establish remedies for the violation of federal con-
stitutional rights that conflict with remedies provided by the Constitution
itself or created by the national legislature.
Was this the solution contemplated by the Framers of the fourth
amendment? Was it generally understood that, upon ratification of the
amendment, the state or National legislatures, or both, would promptly
legislate remedies to be implemented through civil actions in the courts,
or sanctions to be enforced through criminal prosecutions, in protection
of fourth amendment rights? To maintain such a position, one would
have to concede that the Framers had left the rights protected by the
fourth amendment in an extraordinarily vulnerable condition. Perhaps
the fourth amendment could be read as obliging Congress or the state
legislatures to create legal consequences for fourth amendment violations,
but, in the absence of such remedial legislation, the fourth amendment
would, under this view, exist only as a form of words. It is suggested that
such an understanding is in conflict with the founding generation's notion
that the consequences of noncompliance are as much a part of law as are
declarations and directives.
To understand what the Founding Fathers had in mind for the en-
forcement of constitutional rights, it is absolutely necessary to recall that
they regarded themselves as building upon the English legal institutions
that had been transplanted to the colonies.30 Since equity existed only in
a rudimentary condition, these legal institutions were primarily those of
the common law."' It was generally accepted that, where no positively en-
acted law held otherwise, the common law governed rights and duties.3 "
This is highly significant for our coming to grips with the peculiar "in-
had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States. This
exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty would only exist in
three cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to
the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and in another
prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and where it granted an au-
thority to the Union to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely
and totally contradictory and repugnant.
Id. (emphasis in original).
" See Jones, The Reception of the Common Law in the United States, in H. JONES, LEGAL
METHOD 746 (1980); see also 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLrICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 592 (1953)
(noting America's "receptiveness" to English law).
"' See J. SMITH, DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, chs. 8-9 (1965); see also Jones, supra
note 30, at 754.
3 See 1 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 30, at 598. For example, by approximately 1776, Virginia,
New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware had made statutory admonitions which
reflected the attitude that the English common law controlled unless changed by state stat-
ute. Id. The Virginia statute stated that "'the common law of England ...shiould] be
considered as in full force [in the state], until the same sh[ould] be altered by the legislative
power.'" Id.
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completeness" of those constitutional provisions that pronounce the law
regardingcertain rights, but are silent as to the legal consequences which
result from their violation. Alfred Hill has argued that the Founding Fa-
thers gave little attention to the question of the implementation of consti-
tutional provisions, since they anticipated that such would take place
pursuant to the common law.
38
Although the Framers surely did not intend to prohibit legislative
action aiding in the enforcement of constitutional rights, such action was
not required to complete the Constitution as law in Blackstone's sense.
Professor Hill expresses this thought in a different manner by stating
that "[i]t may fairly be assumed that the founding fathers did not con-
template a new species of constitutional tort. There is evidence that the
transgression of a government officer was regarded as a trespass, in accor-
dance with the vocabulary and outlook of the common law."" To regard
such transgressions as trespasses is not to limit the corresponding remedy
to an action in trespass, understood in its strictest sense. As Professor
Hill notes, the term "trespass" at common law was generally used in a
broader sense "to describe the conduct of a government officer actionable
at common law, even though strictly speaking a form of action other than
trespass would have been appropriate in the particular case."" The
Framers' reliance upon the remedial institutions of the common law ex-
plains why although many legal rights could be found in the books with-
out a corresponding remedy being specified, Chief Justice Marshall could
confidently assert as binding, Blackstone's formulation that there are cor-
responding remedies for all legal rights."
It must be conceded that a difficulty in implementation would arise if
a right created by the Constitution had no common-law counterpart and
no appropriate common-law remedy could be found to exist. The fourth
amendment, however, is emphatically free of this problem. The language
of the amendment does not purport to create the right to be secure
33 Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1109, 1131-32 (1969); see also Katz,
The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v.
Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 42-43 (1968) (arguing that "eighteenth century men may not
have supposed there would be any difficulty of implementation so long as the Constitution
was the 'Supreme Law of the Land' applicable in ordinary courts").
84 Hill, supra note 33, at 1132 (footnote omitted); cf. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 198
(1908) (state officer illegally restraining a person is a trespasser and his official status will
not excuse the tort); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 506 (1887) (11th amendment does not im-
pinge upon the principal suits against individual defendants who under color of authority
from the state are guilty of trespass); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S.
446, 452 (1883) (court is not ousted of jurisdiction when an individual being sued asserts
authority as a state officer).
Hill, supra note 33, at 1132.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 11, at *23).
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against unreasonable searches and seizures, but merely recognizes it as an
existing right."7 As Justice Story observed, the fourth amendment "is lit-
tle more than the affirmance of a great constitutional doctrine of the com-
mon law." 8 It is a historical fact that an integral part of that doctrine
was that unreasonable searches and seizures were considered trespasses,
and that officers of the government who abused their authority in such a
manner were liable to those whose persons or property they caused to be
invaded.
39
That this remedial aspect of the common law was well known to the
Framers of the fourth amendment cannot be doubted. It was operative in
the controversy over the legality of general warrants, which arose from
the circumstances accompanying the Crown's arrest of John Wilkesf for
seditious libel during the reign of George III.40 The search and seizure of
the books and papers of Wilkes and forty-eight other Englishmen under
general warrants resulted in the earliest of such litigation in the English
courts.' The controversy spanned the years 1763 to 1765, and its fame in
the colonies became second only to James Otis' attempt to prevent the
issuance to customs officers of writs of assistance. 4 Notably, every action
brought by Wilkes and his associates for the unreasonable searches and
seizures was one for damages against the officials who issued the warrants
and the officers who executed them.3
Therefore, when the common-law origins of the fourth amendment
are recognized, and it is further observed that the amendment does :not
create a right but rather acknowledges an existing one, the amendment
no longer appears to suffer from incompleteness. For the fourth amend-
ment to be law in the fullest sense, it must be understood as requiring an
'7 See 1 T. COOLEY, supra note 25, at 610-11. The fourth amendment is recognized as a
codification of the common-law maxim that "every man's house is his castle" and as such is
protected from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id.
" See 3 J. STORY, supra note 25, § 1895, at 748. The fourth amendment was passed partly
as a result of "the strong sensibility excited, both in England and America, upon the subject
of general warrants almost upon the eve of the American Revolution." Id.
" See 1 T. CooLEY,'supra note 25, at 612 & n.1; 3 J. STORY, supra note 25, § 1895, at 748.
40 See 1 T. COOLEY, supra note 25, at 612 n.1. The practice of arresting persons under gen-
eral warrants, without evidence of their guilt or identification, received "its death-blow from
the boldness of Wilkes and the wisdom of Lord Camden." Id.
41 Id.
" See Quincy Reports, 1761-1772, app. I, at 395-540. See generally J. MARKE, VIGNETTES OF
LEGAL HISTORY251-61 (1965) (historical background of the Writs of Assistance case of 1761,
including Otis' role in the controversy and its relation to the general warrants controversy in
England).
's See, e.g., Money v. Leach, 3 Burr. 1742, 1747, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1078 (K.B. 1765);
Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 206, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768 (K.B. 1763); Wilkes v. Wood, 98
Eng. Rep. 489, 491 (C.P. 1763); Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1031
(1765).
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available remedy for violations of the right asserted. The Framers as-
sumed that this demand was met by the remedial aspect of the common
law regarding unreasonable searches and seizures.
It has been suggested by one scholar that the fourth amendment
"guarantees that the injured person shall not be denied a cause of action
against the trespasser."4 4 This position carries with it the necessary impli-
cation that the abrogation by legislative action of civil remedies for illegal
searches and seizures would violate the fourth amendment, and presuma-
bly the due process clause of the fifth amendment as well." According to
this view, the civil remedy against errant government officers was given
constitutional sanction by the fourth amendment, and cannot lawfully be
abridged.
We would agree that, in light of the Framers' understanding of the
nature of law, the fourth amendment must be understood as guaranteeing
the availability of a remedy for violations of the fourth amendment right;
and if Congress should take affirmative action to deny such a remedy, its
action would be unconstitutional and void. This is not to say, however,
that the fourth amendment gives 'fixed constitutional status to any one
remedy. That the Framers assumed that common-law remedies would be
used to implement fourth amendment rights does not in any way imply
that those specific remedies were themselves of constitutional status. Not
only could other remedies and sanctions be added by governmental action
to the forms of action characteristic of the common-law trespass remedy,
but, in addition, Congress could legitimately replace the trespass remedy
with a criminal or other action, provided that an effective means of en-
forcement, in harmony with the purposes of the fourth amendment, con-
tinued to be available for unreasonable searches and seizures. The point
to be emphasized is that the Framers did not regard the fourth amend-
ment as impotent in the absence of congressional remedial legislation.
The common-law remedy of trespass historically had been available for
unreasonable searches and seizures, and the fourth amendment guaran-
teed that it would continue to be so unless or until the Legislature chose
to enact an effective substitute.
" Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 19 ILL. L. RaV. 303, 307 (1925);
see Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures, 25 COLUm. L. Rzv. 11, 21-22 (1925); see also Buckley, Status of Intoxicating Li-
quor Seized Under Authority of a Subsequently Declared Invalid Search Warrant, 12 G9o.
L.J. 19, 21 (1923). Buckley states that "[t]he object of the fourth amendment... was to
protect the citizen from domestic disturbance by the disorderly intrusion of administrative
officials. Such official misconduct is expressly prohibited by the amendment and both a civil
and criminal action is implied against the erring officers." Buckley, supra, at 21.
,s See Atkinson, supra note 44, at 21; cf. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 598 (1904)
(fourth amendment is intended to give remedy against usurpations of power which result in
violations of private security).
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There is less evidence for the view that the common law understood
governmental oppression of individuals to be a public as well as a private
wrong, thereby rendering offending officers subject to criminal prosecu-
tion by the sovereign. It is noteworthy, however, that such a view was
expressed by Hamilton in The Federalist No. 83, wherein he attempted
to assuage those who were fearful of oppressive modes of collecting the
national revenue with the argument that
as to the conduct of the officers of the revenue, the provision in favor of
trial by jury in criminal cases, will afford the security aimed at. Wilful
abuses of a public authority, to the oppression of the subject, and every
species of official extortion, are offenses against the government; for which,
the persons who commit them, may be indicted and punished according to
the circumstances of the case."'
At the time this was written there was neither a fourth amendment, nor a
national Bill of Rights, and thus, the laws establishing the public rights
and wrongs must have had their source in the common law.
If Hamilton's reading of the common law is correct, the fourth
amendment should perhaps be read as affirming both private and public
rights, with their corresponding modes of redress. Indeed, it could be ar-
gued that the public nature of the right protected by the fourth amend-
ment is indicated by the amendment's language which speaks of "[t]he
right of the people . . . . ",4' The natural sense of these words implies
that the right is not only personal, but also collective or public. No Amer-
ican case, however, has treated the violation of the right protected by the
common law and the fourth amendment as constituting a public crime in
the absence of legislation making it so. Hamilton's assumption that wilful
abuses of a public authority are of a criminal nature does not, then, seem
to have found support in common opinion.
Be that as it may, it must be observed that the trespass remedy is
not devoid of a public end. So much is manifest in the common-law doc-
trine that recovery can be had beyond compensation for the injury re-
ceived. This doctrine of punitive or exemplary damages received its defin-
itive justification in Wilkes v. Wood.48 In that case, Chief Justice Pratt
upheld a large damage award for the victim of a trespass by the King's
officers. In doing so, he stated:
[A] jury have it in their power to give damages for more than the injury
received. Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured per-
son, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such pro-
ceeding for the future and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the
41 THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 500 (A. Hamilton).
" U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (C.P. 1763).
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action itself."
Thus, the remedy considered appropriate by the founding generation for
a violation of fourth amendment rights, that of trespass, served the pur-
pose not only of redress, but of punishment, deterrence, and morality as
well.
THE JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
Assuming that fourth amendment rights were intended to be imple-
mented by means of the remedial institutions of the common law, the
next logical inquiry is whether the state or federal courts, or some combi-
nation thereof, are to be instruments by which the wronged parties may
pursue adequate redress. In defining the limits of the power of the federal
judiciary, the Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall ex-
tend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority. . . ."0 During the first few decades following the
ratification of the Constitution, it was a matter of some controversy
whether this clause was intended to extend the'power of the federal
courts to common-law cases.5 1 As previously indicated, Hamilton envis-
aged wilful abuses by a public authority to be offenses at common law.
52
Since Hamilton considered such crimes to be subject to the constitutional
requirement of trial by jury in criminal cases, it follows that he under-
stood the federal judicial power to extend to common-law crimes. More-
over, if this power extends to wilful abuses of authority viewed as public
wrongs, there would seem to be no ground for denying its extension to
such abuses viewed as private wrongs.
But whatever the original disposition of the Constitution toward ex-
tending the power of the federal judiciary to violations of the common-
law right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, the rat-
ification of the fourth amendment rendered the question practically
49 Id.
0 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L.
REV. 49, 73 (1923). Noting the controversy over federal court jurisdiction of common-law
cases, Warren stated:
[Flor many years... there was a heated political contest between the Federalist and
the Jeffersonian parties as to whether the Federal Courts possessed such jurisdiction
.... [M]any eminent Judges and lawyers maintained at the outset and continued
long to maintain, that such jurisdiction over crimes at common law ... was intended
to be vested in Federal Courts.
Id.
" See supra text accompanying note 46.
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moot.53 By incorporating the common-law doctrine regarding searches
and seizures into its charter of national existence, the people of the
United States gave it constitutional status, thereby placing all controver-
sies arising under that law within the realm of the federal judicial power.
It is axiomatic that for the federal judicial power to operate in all cases
arising under the Constitution, federal courts must be endowed with the
jurisdiction necessary for the exercise of that power. Article III of the
Constitution vests in the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over all
cases "affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls," and
those in which a state shall be a party." As to other cases, the Supreme
Court was given appellate jurisdiction "with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make."" While the Supreme
Court is to be a repository of the judicial power of the United States,"
whether or not inferior federal courts shall exist, and what their jurisdic-
tion will be, are matters left to the discretion of Congress.7
" In 1812, the United States Supreme Court ruled that no legislative act had conferred on
the federal courts criminal jurisdiction over common-law cases. Because federal courts are
dependent on Congress for their jurisdiction (except for the few areas of original jurisdiction
marked off for the Supreme Court by the Constitution in the second section of article i11),
the Court found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether the judicial power was
intended to extend to common-law crimes. United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 32 (1812); see also United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 415 (1816);
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
Charles Warren, on the other hand, has argued on the basis of his examination of an
early draft of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, that section 9 of that law, which gives
federal courts exclusive cognizance of "all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under
the authority of the United States," id. at 76, is intended to give federal courts jurisdiction
over common-law crimes and crimes under the law of nations, Warren, supra note 51, at 73,
77. Warren's interpretation has recently been challenged by Julius Goebel. See J. GOEBEL,
JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS
To 1801 495-96 (The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise, Vol. 1, 1971).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
w Id.
"Id. § 1.
57 Id. It is clear that article III leaves Congress free to establish any inferior federal courts it
deems appropriate, Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943), and it is equally clear that
Congress may determine the scope of jurisdiction of such inferior federal courts, Federal
Power Comm'n v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 307 U.S. 156, 159 (1939).
The Supreme Court has described the constitutional requirements for exercise of the
jurisdiction of the inferior courts as follows:
As regards all courts of the United States inferior to this tribunal, two things are
necessary to create jurisdiction, whether original or appellate. The Constitution must
have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have
supplied it. Their concurrence is necessary to vest it. It is the duty of Congress to act
for that purpose up to the limits of the granted power.
Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1867). Herbert Wechsler described the jurisdic-
tional plan of the Constitution in the following manner:
Congress would decide from time to time how far the federal judicial institution
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Today, with our heavy reliance on the federal judiciary as courts of
first instance in cases involving federal questions, we have a tendency to
forget that throughout our early history, the principal forum for the vin-
dication of constitutional rights had been the state court.58 It is a striking
fact that, prior to 1875, Congress deemed it neither necessary nor desira-
ble to provide federal courts with original jurisdiction over cases involving
rights claimed under the Constitution."' Yet, one must remain cognizant
of the fact that Supreme Court decisions reveal a variety of opinions re-
garding the question of whether and to what extent the jurisdiction of
state courts extends to cases involving federal rights.60
should be used within the limits of the federal judicial power; or, stated differently,
how far judicial jurisdiction should be left to the state courts, bound as they are by
the Constitution ....
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1005-06 (1965).
See Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 H~Asv. L. REv. 545, 545
(1925). As to the jurisdiction of state courts in the early days of the federal judicial system,
Charles Warren stated:
Large numbers of American statesmen were, from the outset of the Government, in
favor of allowing the State Courts to exercise primary, or at least concurrent, jurisdic-
tion in most of the cases to which the Federal judicial power was extended by the
Constitution; and they regarded the exercise of the Federal judicial power as chiefly
necessary in the appellate tribunal.
Id. These American statesmen assumed, of course, that the judicial power of the states ex-
tended to such cases.
In Warren's historical analysis of the Judiciary Act of 1789, he discusses the debate on
the Draft Bill:
The first issue was whether there should be any District Courts of the United States
at all, or whether the functions of executing the Federal laws should be left in the
first instance with the State Courts. It is a singular fact, not always recalled, that
many ardent pro-Constitutionalists had already expressed the belief that the State
Courts might well be entrusted with such power, subject to appeal to the Federal
Supreme Court.
Warren, supra note 51, at 65 (footnote omitted).
", See Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. This Act established general jurisdiction
over federal questions in the lower federal courts, subject to a minimum monetary jurisdic-
tional requirement. Id. For a discussion of the history of the Judiciary Act, see Warren,
supra note 51, at 62 & n.30.
"o On the issue of state enforcement of federal rights, see 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 395-405 (2nd ed. 1832); Barnett, The Delegation of Federal Jurisdiction to
State Courts, 43 AM. L. REV. 852, 855 (1909), reprinted in 3 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAW 1202 (1938); Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground:
Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 187; Warren, supra note 58, at 546-50
(controversy over federal-state jurisdiction during late 1700's and early 1800's); Note, State
Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1551, 1551-58 (1960) (discus-
sion of whether state courts are under a constitutional obligation to enforce federal rights);
Recent Decision, No Injunctive Protection of Constitutional Rights Against Federal Of-
ficers Without Requisite Jurisdictional Amount-Giancana v. Johnson, 34 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 171, 176-78 (1965) (state court jurisdiction to enjoin illegal action by federal officials).
The question of state court power to assume jurisdiction over actions enforcing federal
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That some confusion would arise from the plan of the Constitution
was not unforeseen by its Framers. Hamilton observed:
The erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may distin-
guish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy and nicety;
and these may, in a particular manner, be expected to flow from the estab-
lishment of a constitution founded upon the total or partial incorporation of
a number of distinct sovereignties. 'Tis time only that can mature and per-
fect so compound a system, can liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and
can adjust'them to each other in a harmonious and consistent WHOLE."'
Aspiring, however, to start this "maturation process" off on the proper
foot, Hamilton devoted The Federalist No. 82 to the questions posed by
the new federal structure to the judicial department, and, in particular, to
those questions relating to "the situation of the State courts in regard to
those causes, which are to be submitted to federal jurisdiction." 2 In that
essay, the role envisioned by the Constitutionalists for the state courts in
the execution of federal law comes into focus.
What is written in The Federalist No. 82 comes as no surprise to the
reader. It had been presaged in earlier essays. For example, in The Feder-
alist No. 16, Hamilton stated that opposition to the national government
by seditious individuals "could be overcome by the same means which are
daily employed against the same evil under the State governments. 6 3
Moreover, in The Federalist No. 27, Hamilton asserted that "[tihe plan
reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the federal
head to the individual citizens of the several States, will enable the gov-
ernment to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of
its laws."'6 4 Though these passages refer to the state judicial enforcement
of laws enacted by Congress, the principle embodied therein would lend
support to state judicial enforcement of federal constitutional law as well,
since state magistrates are "equally the ministers of the law of the land,
from whatever source it might emanate." '
An objection has occasionally been raised to this position on the
rights was not answered by the Supreme Court until 1876, when the Court ruled that such
power is inherent in the constitutional structure. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136
(1876). A unanimous Court relied heavily upon Hamilton's discussion in The Federalist No.
82. See 93 U.S. at 138.
61 THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 491 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in original).
62 Id.
63 Id., No. 16, at 117 (A. Hamilton). Hamilton noted:
The magistracy, being equally the ministers of the law of the land, from whatever
source it might emanate, would doubtless be as ready to guard the national as the
local regulations from the inroads of private licentiousness.
Id. at 117.
64 Id., No. 27, at 176 (A. Hamilton).
6" Id., No. 16, at 117 (A. Hamilton).
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groundthat state courts simply-lack jurisdiction over those cases to which
the judicial-power of the United States extends and which involve na-
tional rights .and policy.66 Despite some appearances to the contrary, 
7
Hamilton does not appear to have entertained the possibility of such a
restrictive view-of state jurisdiction. His thesis in The Federalist No. 82
regarding state court jurisdiction under the Federal Constitution envis-
aged the plan of the Federal Convention as "partly federal, and partly
national. ' 68 As it intends "only. . . a partial union. or consolidation, the
State governments .,. . clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which
they- before had, and which were, not, by that act, exclusively delegated to
the United States." ' 9 Therefore, in regard to the judicial power of the
states, the state courts retain all jurisdiction not taken away by the Con-
stitution. Since there is no clause in the Constitution confining cases
within federal cognizance to the federal courts, state courts clearly hold
concurrent jurisdiction -over. those cases falling within that description of
cases over which the state courts previously had cognizance.7 0 Hamilton
Martin. v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816). Justice Story, writing for
the majority in Hunter's Lessee, stated the Court's position concerning state court jurisdic-
tion over "national policy" cases as follows:
[A]s to cases arriving [sic] under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States . . . the state courts could not ordinarily 'possess a direct jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction over such cases could not exist in the state-courts previous to the adop-
tion of the constitution, and it could not afterwards be directly conferred on them; for
the constitution expressly requires the judicial power to be vested in courts ordained
and established by the United States.
Id. at 334-35. Justice Story indicated that these remarks extended to cases affecting ambas-
sadors, other public ministers and consuls, and to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 335.
It should be noted that this argument must.be considered in conjunction with Justice
Story's analysis that "the constitution is imperative upon congress to vest all the judicial
power of the United States, in the shape of original jurisdiction, in the supreme and inferior
courts created under, its own authority." Id. at 336. In Story's scheme -of things,.if this power
of Congress were. merely discretionary, the Constitution would be in effect a blueprint for
ineffectiveness, since:a vast.numbef-of constitutional rights and obligations would be judi-
cially enforceable only. at the discretion of Congress. See id. at 338-39.
07 See THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 491 (A. Hamilton). Hamilton, discussing state court
causes of action which are submitted to federal jurisdiction, questioned whether federal ju-
risdiction was to be exclusiveor if both "courts [were] topossess a concurrent jurisdiction."
Id. Hamilton appears to have answered this question by noting that "[s]tates will retain all
preexisting authorities which may not be exclusively delegated to the federal head; and that
this exclusive delegation can . . . exist. . . where an exclusive authority is, in express terms,
granted to the Union .. " Id. at 492 (emphasis in-original).
" Id., No. 39, at 246 (J. Madison).
0" Id., No. 32, at 198 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in original).
"'.Id., No. 82, at 492 (A. Hamilton), Although Hamilton states that the doctrine of concur-
rent jurisdiction is applicable 'to cases in which. state courts had recognized jurisdiction in
the past, he proceeds to note that "[i]t is not equally evident in relation to cases which may
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regarded as incontestable the proposition that state courts would have
jurisdiction over those cases arising under the Constitution which in-
volved rights and obligations that were actionable in state courts prior to
the ratification of the Constitution. He also asserted the legitimacy of
state jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution over which
there was no preexisting state jurisdiction, provided such jurisdiction was
not expressly denied by Congress. 1
It is not completely clear, however, whether Hamilton regarded juris-
diction over this latter class of cases as devolving upon state courts purely
by virtue of the states existing as parts of one whole, or whether he be-
lieved such jurisdiction to be dependent on positive grants by the state
legislatures. His statement that "the state courts would have a concurrent
jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the union, where it was
not expressly prohibited '72 does not indicate a contingent character to
that jurisdiction. For the purposes of the argument here, however, it is
unnecessary to determine whether the Constitution indeed directly pro-
vides state jurisdiction over cases to which the federal judicial power ex-
tends absent congressional prohibition. The preexistent nature of the
right protected by the fourth amendment, and the fact that state courts
universally possessed jurisdiction over common-law trespasses by govern-
ment officers, place all cases arising under that amendment in the cate-
gory of. cases that "grow out of," but are certainly not "peculiar to" the
Constitution.7 8 According to Hamilton's analysis, state judicial authority
over such cases is unquestionable.
Hamilton's position on state jurisdiction over federal issues was de-
grow out of, and be peculiar to, the Constitution .. . ; for not to allow the State courts a
right of jurisdiction in such cases, can hardly be considered as the abridgement of a preex-
isting authority." Id. at 493 (emphasis in original). Over such caies, the National Legislature
may, if it so chooses, give the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, not only is it forbidden that the state courts be deprived of any part of
their primitive jurisdiction, except as it relates to appeal, but "in every case in which they
were not expressly excluded by the future acts of the national legislature, they will of course
take cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth. (This is to be inferred]
from the nature of judiciary power, and from the general genius of the system." Id.
7' See id.
Is Id. at 493-94.
73 See id. Story has commented upon "private injustice" and the jurisdictionally permissible
relief in the following manner:
[T]he national government is per se incapable of any merely personal wrong..... In
regard to property, the remedy for injuries lies against the immediate perpetrators,
who may be sued, and cannot shelter themselves under any imagined immunity of the
government .... Cases, indeed, may occur, in which he may not always have ade-
quate redress, without some legislation by Congress. As for example, in places ceded
to the United States, and over which they have an exclusive jurisdiction . . . [h]ere
he must rely on the justice of Congress, of the executive departments.
3 J. STORY, supra note 25, at 539-40.
ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
fended by John Marshall during the Virginia Ratifying Convention in the
context of a discussion of the legal consequences of oppressive behavior
by federal collection officers."' According to Marshall, the state courts
could try individual actions against federal officers, as could the federal
courts, assuming Congress gives them appropriate jurisdiction. With re-
spect to the federal courts, Marshall may have agreed with Hamilton that
their jurisdiction would reach wrongs at common law, or he may have
anticipated federal legislation. As to state courts, the source of the law
could be either positive state law, the common law as it is in force in the
states, or federal law." Marshall noted that "[t]he state courts will not
lose the jurisdiction of the cases they now decide. They have a concur-
rence of jurisdiction with the federal courts in those cases in which the
latter have cognizance."" Therefore, state court jurisdiction over cases
arising from the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
was assured, both before and after the ratification of the fourth
amendment.
The Framers' view that the state courts would have jurisdiction over
cases involving federal rights has led one prominent scholar to make the
assertion that "[ifn the scheme of the Constitution, [the state courts] are
the primary guarantors of constitutional rights. . .. ," This statement is
founded in the recognition that the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789s78 which
established the jurisdiction of the federal courts," was the product of a
compromise between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, "so framed
as to secure the votes of those who, while willing to see the experiment of
a Federal Constitution tried, were insistent that the federal courts should
be given the minimum powers and jurisdiction."'* The Judiciary Act did
11 See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 554 (1937). George Mason initiated the debate over the legal
consequences of the oppressive behavior of federal collection officers by waging an attack on
the extent of the judicial power delegated by the Constitution. Id. at 524. Federal court
jurisdiction, he stated, as granted in article III, section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution, will
encompass "all cases affecting revenue, exercise, and custom-house officers." Id. Mason que-
ried that if it is difficult to bring federal officers to justice in state courts, what relief can be
expected from federal judges? Id.
Marshall argued against this proposition, stating that an injured party indeed would
trust an inferior federal court, and would receive the appropriate redress. Id. at 554. Fur-
thermore, added Marshall, "[tihere is no clause in the Constitution which bars the individ-
ual member injured from applying to the state courts to give him redress." Id.
" See id.
76 Id.
" Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1401 (1953).
78 Ch. 20, §§ 1-35, 1 Stat. 73-93 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.
(1976)).
79 Id. § 9.
" Warren, supra note 51, at 53.
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not confer. the entire judicial power on inferior federal courts. Neither the
district nor the circuit courts received general jurisdiction of cases arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.' Nor were
those courts given cognizance .of sujits or, proceedings against federal of-
ficers for their conduct in executing the laws."' The intention of the Judi-
ciary Act, therefore, was to leave the. enforcement -of, remedies against fed-
eral officers to the state. courts. When the decision, contravened a right or
immunity claimed under the Federal .Constitution or 'under a federal
treaty, statute or commission,"2 national supervision -was to be exercised
by a ,writ :of error from the highest court of the state.to the Supreme
Court of.the United States.'- ' ' -.
The Judiciary Act conferred original jurisdiction on the .district
courts over all actions involving .seizures occuring both on land and at
sea.8 3 Chief Justice Marshall had occasion. to explain, the. significance of
this provision for the question of- unreasonable seizures in Slocum v.
Mayberry." That case resulted from the seizure of a vessel and its cargo
by a federal customs.surveyor.8 The, owners of .the-cargo had brought a
writ :of replevin' in the state: court of Rhode Island to' have their property,
restored, and procured a judgment against. the surveyor.8 " Claiming that
the state court lacked jurisdiction, the customs surveyor removed the case
to the United States Supreme Court. 7 Chief Justice Marshall, held'that,
if an officer has a right under a federal law to seize. for ,a supposed forfei-
ture, which is to be proceeded against in a federal court,..jurisdiction over
the question whether. such forfeiture- was ",'rightful-or'tortious" lies exclu-
81 Although the circuit and district courts were conferred somewhat limited powers in rela-
tion to the powers that could have been granted, see- supra note 78, the circuit courts. did
receive jurisdiction over diversity of citizenship cases, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1
Stat. 78 (1789), and the district courts' we're given admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, id. §
9, 1 Stat. 76-77. '
88 See Judiciary Act of '1789, ch. 20,§§ 9, 11, 25,.1 Stat. 76-77, 78 -79, 85-86 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976)). '
83 Id. § 9, 1 Stat. 76-77: With respect to the subject of seizures,' the'Judiciarv Act provided:
[t]hat the district courts shall have . . . exclusive oriiginal cognizance" of ,ll civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under' laws of
impost, navigation or trade of the United Stat s, where the seizures are made on
waters which'are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten 'or more tons burthen,
within their respective districts as well as upon the lhigh seas; a saving to suitors, in
all cases, the right of a common-law remedy, where the common law'is competent to
give it; and shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all seizures on land,' on
other waters than as aforesaid, made, and of all suits, for penalties and forfeitures
incurred, under the laws of the United States.
Id.
84 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1 (1817). .
Id. at 2.
" Id. at 2-3.
87 Id. at 3.
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sively with the federal courts, "and cannot be drawn to another forum."88
However, the remedies for wrongful seizures, with the exception of those
available through the federal courts by virtue of their admiralty jurisdic-
tion, must besciught; under the Judiciary. Act, in the state courts.8 9
It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Marshall also held, that .the state
courts may determine the .question of whether the federal law under
which the .officer. claims his authority- applies to the matter seized.90 In
the case at hand, the cargo, as distinct from the vessel, was not subject to
seizure under any. law, of the United States. 1 Since no, act of Congress
-forbade the state courts to take cognizance of suits arising from the
seizure, of.such goods, the state court in Slocum properly exercised its
jurisdiction over the officer's unauthorized seizure.2
The gist of this holding was restated by Chancellor Kent in his Com-
mentaries on American Law: --
If the officer of the United States who seizes, or the court which awards the
process to seize, has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, then the inquiry' iito
the validity of the seizure belongs exclusively to the federal courts. But if
there be no jurisdiction in the instance in which it is -asserted, as if 'a mar-
shal of the United States, under an execution in favor of the United States
against- A, should seize the person- or -property of B, then the state courts
.have juiisdiction to protect.the person and the property so invaded illegally;
and it is to be observed that the jurisdiction of the ,state courts in Rhode
.Island was admitted by the Supreme Court of the. United States, in Slocum
..v. Mayberry, upon that very ground.9
Kent's statement of this jurisdiction~al doctrine was later expressly repu-
'diated by the Supreme Court in Freeman V. Howe95 and in Buck v.
Colbath.9" In Freeman, Justice -Nelson; writing for the majority, correctly
;.Id. at9710. . ' . .
Id. at 10. Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the--Court, stated that:
if the seizure be finally adjudged wrongful, and ivithout reasonable cause, [the owner]
may proceed, at his election, by a iuit at common law, . . . for the illegal act. Yet,
een in'thiat case, any reinedy wlich the law may afford to the party supposing him-
self to be aggrieved :'. . could be prosecuted onlym' inthe state court. The common law
. tribunals of the United States are closed against such applications.'.:. . Congress. has
refused to the courts of the union the power of deciding on the conduct of their of-
ficers ifi the execution of their -laws- in suits at common law, until the case shall have
passed through the state courts.
Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 11.
" Id. at 12-13.
" 1 J. KENT, supra note 60, at 410.
" Id. at 410.
" 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
" 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1865). ...
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perceived that Kent's position allows the state courts to determine the
jurisdiction of the federal courts awarding process to seize, thereby draw-
ing into the state courts questions both of seizures of property and of
arrests made under the authority of the federal courts.97 To this, Justice
Nelson remarked that "no Government could maintain the administra-
tion or execution of its laws, civil or criminal, if the jurisdiction of its
judicial tribunals were subject to the determination of another." ' It is to
be remembered, however, that a state court ruling against the jurisdiction
of a federal court to issue a process to seize would be subject to appeal to
the federal judiciary, and would therefore not necessarily be inimical to
national supremacy, contrary to the implication of Justice Nelson's
opinion.9 19
Justice Nelson attempted to disassociate Marshall's opinion in Slo-
cum from Kent's position by asserting that in Slocum the property over
which the state court exercised its legitimate jurisdiction had not been
"seized" by the officer, and therefore, its replevin was no obstruction to
the jurisdiction of the federal courts.'00 This argument is problematic. A
replevin action was deemed necessary by the plaintiff in Slocum because
his property was being detained by the federal officer. A seizure surely
had taken place. The issue was whether such seizure and detention were
lawful.' 01 The only difference between Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
Slocum and Kent's comment is that Marshall limited his discussion to
the question of the jurisdiction of the federal officer to seize and detain,
and did not reach that of the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue process
to seize. 0 2 There is no evidence that Marshall's willingness to allow state
determination of certain federal jurisdictional questions in the course of
state court proceedings to protect the rights of their citizens did not ex-
tend to questions of judicial, as well as executive jurisdiction. Justice Nel-
son, in Freeman, invoked United States v. Peters"3 to establish that "it
belongs to the Federal courts to determine the question of their own ju-
risdiction . . . ."I" However, Peters essentially stands for the proposition
that "the ultimate right to determine the jurisdiction of the courts of the
union . . .necessarily resides in the supreme judicial tribunal of the na-
tion . . ,,.'0 This obviously did not exclude initial determination of
such matters by state courts, but merely assured the right to appeal such
97 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 458-59.
" Id. at 459.
" See Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 197 (1867).
,o 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 458.
101 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 9.
,03 Id. at 10-11.
103 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809).
104 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 459-60.
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 136 (emphasis added).
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decisions to the federal Supreme Court.
The doctrine enunciated in Freeman was refined by the Court in
Buck v. Colbath.10' In that case, Justice Miller asserted the ruling princi-
ple to be:
[W]henever property has been seized by an officer of the court, by virtue of
its process, the property is to be considered as in the custody of the court,
and under its control for the time being; and that no other court has a right
to interfere with that possession, unless it be some court which may have a
direct supervisory control over the court whose process has first taken pos-
session, or some superior jurisdiction in the premises....
Whenever the litigation is ended, or the possession of the officer or court is
discharged, other courts are at liberty to deal with it according to the rights
of the parties before them, whether those rights require them to take pos-
session of the property or not."'
According to Justice Miller, therefore, a writ of replevin could not be in-
stituted in a state court to retrieve property seized and held under federal
process.
In the Buck case, however, replevin was not the remedy at issue;
rather, the federal officer had been sued in trespass for wrongful
seizure.108 Justice Miller held that such an action did not interfere with
the principle stated, since the possession of the property by the federal
court was not in dispute.10' The case in the federal court, which was an
attachment suit, could proceed at the same time that the trespass action
was being determined in the state court. The fact that similar questions
might be at issue in both trials was not necessarily a fatal objection.110
Justice Miller's position is eminently sensible. It goes beyond that out-
lined by Marshall in Slocum by virtue of the fact that it apparently
places all property, whether lawfully or unlawfully seized by federal of-
ficers under color of process, outside the jurisdiction of the state courts
until the federal courts have finished with it. However, it falls short of
Justice Nelson's rather extreme position in Freeman in that it allows for
actions in state courts involving seizures by federal officers, which actions
may raise questions of federal jurisdiction, as long as those actions do not
obstruct the federal courts in the execution of their duties. This course
-- 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 341-42.
107 Id.
10I Id. at 340-41.
I" Id. at 342.
11 See id. at 345. Justice Miller stated in Buck that although a court has obtained jurisdic-
tion of a case, this does not preclude other courts from deciding other matters closely re-
lated to "those before the first court, and, in some instances, requiring the decision of the
same questions exactly." Id.
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would "maintain the dignity and just authority of every court,"' ' . and at
the same time would permit swift determination in the state courts of
alleged wrongs to individuals by federal officers.
CONCLUSION
It'has been argued here -that neither the silefice of Congress regarding
the implementation of the fourth amendment'right, for the unavailability
of a federal court for the redress of that right,. were understood to affect
in any way the'existence of a remedy or the availability.of that remedy in
a suit at law. The remedy Was assumed to exist as a matter of right under
,the fourth amendment,; and the state courts commonly were understood
to have jurisdiction to. enforce the remedy.: Moreover, when one studies
the case reports of the first three-quarters of the 19th century, one finds
that, in cases alleging a wrongful search or seizure' by a federal officer,
traditional common-law forms of action associated with trespass were in-
deed, without exception, the modes of redress ifivoked. 1" For those of us
weaned on modern procedural law, however,"in which it is a settled prac-
tice to declare, when relevant, the constitutional source of the right being
asserted, it appears curious that in those early' cases, the officer commonly
,is charged with acting outside his legitimate authority to search or seize,
withoit any reference to the fact that the action with 'which he is charged
is in violation of a constitutional right.' And often, officers are described
as liable "in suits at common law."'" DOs this 'imply that the right to a
remedy in such cases arises under -the' common law, and not 'under the
fourth amendment? Does the liability of the: federal officer derive not
from the Constitution, but from'a law of less'than constitutional stature?
Initially, it must be observed thit it would be erroneous to assume
that a tiespass by. a government officer 'was not understood by the Fram-
ers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights:to be a constitutionalca'se.
At the very least, the Constitution would bear on the officer's &lfense. For
example, if the federal officer attempted to plead a warrant in justifica-
tion of his action, the fourth amendment's requirements' for the issuance
"' Id. at 341. - . .-
See, e.g., Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334, 335-36 (1865) (suit against U.S. marshal
alleging trespass); Day v. Gallup, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 97, 97 (1864) (trespass action against U.S
marshal); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 453 (1861) (replevin action against U.S.
marshal).
"I See, e.g., Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334, 339-40 (1865) (federal marshal alleged
to have abused authority); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 124-25 (1851) (mili-
tary officer charged with not acting under legal process); Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
284, 291-92 (1851) (good-faith reliance upon superior's instructions will not preclude finding
of acting outside legal authority). 1, .
"4 Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 10 (1817). 
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of a warrant provided the standard of judging the validity of the warrant,
whether it issued from a state or a federal judicial officer.115 In other
words, the fourth amendment "supplies the controlling behavioral stan-
dard .... "'
Secondly, one must keep in mind the relationship between the com-
mon law and the Constitution.
Even if the right to recover must be found in the common law, the common
law does not, in the United States, have an existence independent of the
Constitution. The common law has always absorbed and given effect to in-
terests created by statutes and constitutions in the same way that it has
given effect to interests created by judicial decision. If the Constitution is
viewed as an integral aspect of the common law, as it ought to be, the di-
chotomy of Constitution and common law becomes a false one." 7
A description of this phenomenon is provided by Professor Hill:
The process of adaptation of the forms of action to serve statutory and con-
stitutional ends was sometimes tortuous, but it was a significant part of the
common law system and a reason for its continued vitality. If, in the case of
an officer charged with an unconstitutional encroachment, the remedy of
trespass or ejectment was deemed to be 'given' by the common law, it was
nevertheless the Constitution that determined the outcome."s
To say that the remedy of trespass in search and seizure cases was
deemed to be "given" by the common law, however, is not necessarily to
deny that the right to such a remedy would be, under certain circum-
stances, constitutionally dictated as well.
The fourth amendment, when viewed in light of its common-law ori-
gins and the view shared by the founding generation of the nature of law,
should be understood as requiring the availability of an effective remedy
or sanction for fourth amendment violations. In the absence of legislative
provision for such a remedy, the available common-law remedy would
thereby exist as a matter of constitutional right. Since the fourth amend-
ment is "little more than the affirmance of a great constitutional doctrine
of the common law,"'1 9 and since the Founding Fathers clearly relied on
the remedial institutions of the common law for the implementation of
the Constitution, it should not cause surprise that little occasion was
found for reference to the fourth amendment in suits involving unreason-
"' See, e.g., Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286, 288-89 (1816). Sandford involved a trespass
action against federal revenue inspectors. Id. at 286. The warrant under which they pleaded
their defense had issued from a justice of the peace. Id. The court referred to the fourth
amendment as the standard for the validity of the warrant. Id. at 289.
"I Hill, supra note 33, at 1159.
117 Id.
.S Id. at 1133.
"1 3 J. STORY, supra note 25, at 748.
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able searches or seizures. Except for one or two of the specifics which the
amendment requires for the issuance of warrants, no difference between
it and the common law on the subject existed. Indeed, the common law
provided the guidance for the interpretation of the general terms of the
amendment. Thus, in conformity with the pleading conventions that ex-
isted prior to the advent of the modern system of code pleading, which
"conventions had a foundation in English history wholly unrelated to any
attempt to identify the sovereign source of an asserted right in a federal
system, ' 120 suits "at common law" were considered perfectly adequate to
vindicate 1 2 "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
''
11
12
12o Hill, supra note 33, at 1130.
121 Cf. Jaflin, Federal Procedural Revision, 21 VA. L. REv. 504, 525-26 (1935). Concerning
the various instances in which a common-law suit could be used to raise a constitutional
issue, Jaffin stated:
[A]fter centuries of evolution in England, litigation had become synonymous with the
forms of action at Common Law and the bills in Equity. What safer way, then, of
raising a constitutional question then [sic] by an action by trespass quare clausum
fregit, ejectment, replevin in the cepit, detinue, trover, action on the case, covenant,
special or indebitatus assumpsit, or a bill for equitable relief.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
'2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
